This paper precisely characterizes secret sharing schemes based on arbitrary linear codes by using the relative dimension/length profile (RDLP) and the relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW). We first describe the equivocation Δ m of the secret vector s = [s 1 ,...,s l ] given m shares in terms of the RDLP of linear codes. We also characterize two thresholds t 1 and t 2 in the secret sharing schemes by the RGHW of linear codes. One shows that any set of at most t 1 shares leaks no information about s, and the other shows that any set of at least t 2 shares uniquely determines s. It is clarified that both characterizations for t 1 and t 2 are better than Chen et al.'s ones derived by the regular minimum Hamming weight. Moreover, this paper characterizes the strong security in secret sharing schemes based on linear codes, by generalizing the definition of stronglysecure threshold ramp schemes. We define a secret sharing scheme achieving the α-strong security as the one such that the mutual information between any r elements of (s 1 ,...,s l ) and any α − r + 1 shares is always zero. Then, it is clarified that secret sharing schemes based on linear codes can always achieve the α-strong security where the value α is precisely characterized by the RGHW. key words: secret sharing scheme, linear code, relative generalized Hamming weight, relative dimension/length profile
Introduction
Secret sharing scheme [2] , [15] is a process of encoding a secret s into a set of n pieces of information segments (called shares) in such a way that only certain subsets of them can determine s. The collection of subsets that can determine s is called the access structure of the secret sharing scheme. An element in the access structure is called qualified set, otherwise, nonqualified set. Secret sharing schemes typically have the following complementary thresholds t 1 ,t 2 (≤ n): (1) any set of at most t 1 shares leaks no information of the secret, and (2) any set of at least t 2 shares is qualified set. When the secret sharing scheme satisfies t 1 + 1 = t 2 , the scheme is called a secret sharing scheme with the (t 2 , n)-threshold access structure or (t 2 , n)-threshold scheme. Shamir's scheme [15] is based on inter- polation of a (t 2 − 1)-degree polynomial, and it is known as a typical (t 2 , n)-threshold scheme.
McEliece et al. [12] first investigated the relation between linear codes and secret sharing schemes. They pointed out that shares in Shamir's threshold scheme [15] can be viewed as symbols of a codeword in Reed-Solomon code [10] . Piepryzk et al. [14] clarified that threshold schemes can be constructed from maximum distance separable (MDS) codes [10] . Massey [11] extended McEliece et al.'s construction to those based on general linear codes C , and demonstrated that there exists a relationship between a qualified set and a codeword in the dual code C ⊥ of C . Duursma et al. [6] gave another construction of secret sharing schemes which use a linear code C and its subcode C ⊂ C with dim (C /C ) = 1 to encode s into shares. Moreover, they characterized the thresholds t 1 ,t 2 in their scheme by the minimum distance of the collection of cosets C /C , called coset distance.
On the other hand, since regular (t 2 , n)-threshold schemes generate shares from a secret scalar s, i.e., an element of a field F, Blakley [1] and Yamamoto [18] generalized (t 2 , n)-threshold schemes for an l-dimensional vector s = [s 1 ,... ,s l ] ∈ F l (1 ≤ l ≤ t 2 − 1). Their schemes are called (t 2 , l, n)-threshold ramp schemes, and realize l times smaller bit-size of each share than regular (t 2 , n)-threshold schemes. In (t 2 , l, n)-threshold schemes, there exists a trade-off between the size of each share and the amount of information leaked from nonqualified sets according to l. Namely, the thresholds t 1 ,t 2 satisfy t 1 + l = t 2 , and i/l (i = 1,... ,l − 1) of Shannon entropy about s leaks from any set of t 1 + i shares. Yamamoto [18] classified threshold ramp schemes into two classes. One is weaklysecure schemes, and the other is strongly-secure schemes. In the case of weakly-secure schemes, some elements of s might leak out deterministically from a set whose cardinality is smaller than t 2 . In contrast, strongly-secure schemes guarantee that no information about a tuple (s i : i ∈ I ) for any I ⊆ {1,... ,l} can be obtained from any t 2 − |I | shares. Hence, strongly-secure schemes are more secure than weakly-secure schemes. Threshold ramp schemes can be constructed by using MDS codes as well as regular threshold schemes. Nishiara et al. [13] proposed a stronglysecure threshold ramp schemes based on a polynomial interpolation. Their scheme employs a systematic MDS code transformed from a Reed-Solomon code.
Chen et al. [4] extended threshold ramp schemes, and
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by RGHW always tight Table 2 Comparison of characterizations for the α-strong security.
Characterization method Tightness of the characterization [8] by 1 and t 2 in each of their two constructions, respectively. However, these characterizations are loose, i.e., they do not always describe the maximum possible value of t 1 and the minimum possible value of t 2 in their schemes. Also, the information leaked from more than t 1 shares was not precisely analyzed. That is, no precise characterization of secret sharing schemes based on arbitrary linear codes has been presented yet.
The first aim of this paper is to characterize secret sharing schemes based on general linear codes precisely. We give a formal definition of secret sharing schemes based on linear codes by a linear code D 1 , its subcode D 2 , and their punctured codes C 1 and C 2 . Our definition includes Massey's construction [11] , Duursma et al.'s one [6] and both of Chen et al.'s two constructions [4] . We precisely characterize the minimum uncertainty (called equivocation [17] ) of the secret vector given m(≤ n) shares by the relative dimension/length profile (RDLP) [9] 
We also derive a new characterization of thresholds t 1 and t 2 by the relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) [9] . Table 1 summarizes the comparison of our characterization by the RGHW and existing ones by different methods for thresholds t 1 ,t 2 . Duursma et al.'s characterization by the coset distance can be viewed as a special case of ours where the secret is restricted to be an elements of F. Moreover, it is clarified that our characterization by the RGHW always describe the maximum possible t 1 and the minimum possible t 2 , unlike Chen et al.'s ones.
The second aim of this paper is to characterize the strong security in secret sharing schemes based on general linear codes, by generalizing the definition of stronglysecure threshold ramp schemes. We first define an antiaccess set J as a special set of shares, which is a generalized definition of nonqualified sets in strongly-secure ramp threshold schemes [18] . An anti-access set J guarantees that for any I ⊆ {1,... ,l}, no information about a tuple (s i : i ∈ I ) can be obtained from |J | + 1 − |I | shares of J . We also define a secret sharing scheme achieving the α-strong security as the one such that all subsets of shares with cardinality at most α are anti-access sets. We then clarify that the schemes of Massey [11] and Chen et al. [4, Sect. 4.1] can always achieve the α-strong security where the value α is precisely characterized by the RGHW. Table 2 presents the comparison of our characterization by the RGHW and existing one for the α-strong security. Similar to the thresholds t 1 ,t 2 we stated above, it is proved that the characterization of α by the RGHW is better than the existing characterization by the minimum Hamming weight [8] .
One merit of secret sharing schemes based on arbitrary linear code is the efficiency in terms of the size of a field F, since there is a rich variety of long linear codes over F rather than MDS codes over F. This is because the MDS nature of the code restricts the maximum possible number of shares in threshold schemes. In fact, the so-called Main Conjecture on MDS codes [10, p.327] implies that the length of an MDS code over F is at most |F| plus a constant (1 or 2). Especially, the possible length of Reed-Solomon code over F is at most |F| − 1. Hence, in order to generate more than |F| shares from a secret element s ∈ F by an MDS code, the MDS code must be constructed over a field whose size is larger than |F|. It is quite inefficient, especially in the case where a secret sharing scheme is used in cryptographic secure computation [4] . In contrast, secret sharing schemes based on long linear codes can construct such applications efficiently. Then, our characterization precisely determines the property of secret sharing schemes from the parameter of the linear code.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 introduces basic notations and gives a formal definition of secret sharing schemes based on linear codes. Sect. 3 precisely characterizes the amount of the secret information leaked from m(≤ n) pieces of shares, and clarifies that our characterization is better than existing researches. Sect. 4 gives the definition of the strong security in secret sharing schemes. Further, this section reveals the region of the number of shares, in which the strong security can be achieved. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes this paper.
Preliminary

Basic Notations
Let H(X) be Shannon's entropy of a random variable X, H(X|Y ) be the conditional entropy of X given Y , and I(X;Y ) be the mutual information between X and Y [5] . Let F stand for a finite field. Let |X | denote the cardinality of a set X . For sets X and Y , we denote by X \Y = {x ∈ X : x Y } the difference of sets X and Y . The Hamming weight of a vector
For a linear subspace C ⊆ F n , the minimum Hamming distance or minimum Hamming weight of C is given by
A subspace of a code is called a subcode. For any linear code C , we define its dual code by
where x · y represents the standard inner product of vectors x and y.
Secret Sharing Scheme Based on Linear Codes
In this subsection, we formally define a secret sharing scheme based on linear codes. The projection or punctured code P J (C ) of a code C ∈ F N is the map given by
Now we define the following secret sharing scheme that generates n shares. For an index set X ⊆ A = {1,... ,N} with |X | = n elements, we define the punctured codes C 1 = P X (D 1 ) and
Choose an arbitrary linear code S satisfying
i.e., direct sum. We then write the dimension of the coset
Let s ∈ F l be the secret which is assumed to be uniformly distributed over F l . To generate n shares, we first choose a codeword c 2 ∈ C 2 uniformly at random and independently from s. Fix an arbitrary isomorphism ψ :
and send or store each element c i for i ∈ X as a share.
Here we note that C 2 ⊂ C 1 always holds in this definition. Also note that S can be always chosen, for instance by completing a basis of C 2 to one of C 1 .
Let us consider the following case.
Then, our definition is equivalent to the one proposed by Massey [11] and Chen et al. [4, Sect. 4.1] .
Moreover, the scheme given by Duursma et al. [6] and the scheme referred to as a more fruitful approach in [4, Sect. 
Characterization of Secret Sharing Schemes
This section precisely characterizes the amount of the secret information leaked from m(≤ n) pieces of shares in the secret sharing scheme given by Definition 1.
Equivocation of the Secret
Let S be a random variable whose realization is a secret vector s. Let C I = (C i : i ∈ I ) be a tuple of random variables for an index set I ⊆ X , where the realization of C i is a share c i . Then, the minimum uncertainty of S given m shares is defined by
which is called equivocation [17] . We will clarify that, in the secret sharing scheme defined by Definition 1, the equivocation of S is precisely characterized by the relative dimension/length profile (RDLP) [9] . For a subset I of A = {1,... ,N}, the shortened code C I of a code C ⊆ F N is defined as the set of all codewords whose components are all zero outside of I , that is,
For example, for J = {2, 3} (N = 3) and
The RDLP of C 1 and C 2 is defined by the maximum difference of dimension between shortened codes (C 1 ) I and (C 2 ) I as follows.
Definition 2 (Relative dimension/length profile [9] ). Let C 1 ∈ F N be a linear code and C 2 be a subcode of C 1 . The i-th relative dimension/length profile (RDLP) of C 1 and C 2 is defined by
is equivalent to the i-th regular dimension/length profile [7] of C 1 .
Note that, for a code C ⊆ F N and an index set J ⊆ A , dual codes of a punctured code P J (C ) and a shortened code C J are defined as
respectively, i.e., dual codes over P J (F N ). Theorem 4 determines the equivocation Δ m defined in Eq.(1) by the RDLP of C ⊥ 2 and C ⊥ 1 , and also (D ⊥ 2 ) X and (D ⊥ 1 ) X . Thereom 4. In the secret sharing scheme defined by Definition 1, the equivocation given m(≤ n) shares is characterized by the RDLP as follows.
Proof. Let I ⊆ X be an arbitrary index set with cardinality |I | = m. It is shown by [4, Theorem 10] that we have the conditional entropy of S given C I as follows.
H(S|C
For a code C ⊆ F N and an index set J ⊆ A , we have 
Recall C ⊥ 1 and C ⊥ 2 are defined as subspaces of P X (F N ) for an index set X ⊆ A . Hence the equivocation Δ m is given by
Lastly, we will prove the second equality. Forney's second duality lemma [7, Lemma 2] 
Bounds of Thresholds
Secret sharing schemes typically have the following complementary thresholds t 1 ,t 2 : (1) any set I ⊆ X of at most t 1 shares offers the mutual information I(S;C I ) = 0, and (2) any set J ⊆ X of at least t 2 shares offers the mutual information I(S;C J ) = H(S). This section clarifies the maximum value of t 1 and minimum value of t 2 in the secret sharing scheme of Definition 1 by the relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) defined by Luo et al. [9] .
Definition 5 (Relative generalized Hamming weight [9] ). Let A = {1,... ,N}. Let C 1 ∈ F N be a linear code and C 2 be a subcode of C 1 . The i-th relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) of C 1 and C 2 is defined by
The following proposition given by Luo et al. [9] clarifies the relationship between the RGHW and the RDLP. { 0}) is equivalent to the i-th regular generalized Hamming weight [17] of C 1 .
Remark 8.
The first RGHW M 1 (C 1 , C 2 ) of C 1 and C 2 is equivalent to the coset distance of C 1 /C 2 , given by Duursma et al. [6] .
We then give the following theorem.
Thereom 9.
Consider the secret sharing scheme defined by Definition 1. Then, for a set I ⊆ X , the mutual information between S and C I satisfies I(S;C I ) = 0 if
and I(S;
Proof. For an arbitrary index set I ⊆ X with cardinality |I | = m, the maximum mutual information between S and C I is expressed by the equivocation from Theorem 4 as follows.
max I ⊆X ,|I |=m
I(S;C I ) = H(S) − min
Hence, from Proposition 6, the smallest index set satisfying I(S;C I ) = 1 is of size
This implies that I(S;C I ) = 0 whenever Eq.(3) holds.
Next consider the minimum mutual information between S and C I for |I | = m. The relation between the shortened code and punctured code of a code C ⊆ F N for an index set J ⊆ A is given by dim C = dim C J + dim PJ (C ) from Forney's first duality lemma [7, Lemma 1], whereJ = A \J . Hence, Eq.(2) can be rewritten as
whereĪ = X \I . Thus, the minimum mutual information is given by min I ⊆X ,|I |=m
I(S;C I ) = H(S) − max I ⊆X ,|I |=m
H(S|C
From Proposition 6, we thus have the largest index set I satisfying I(S;C I ) = l − 1 is of size
This implies that I(S;C I ) = 0 whenever Eq.(4) holds. The thresholds given by the right-hand side of Eq.(3) and Eq.(4) in Theorem 9 are always tight. This is because the proof of Theorem 9 also reveals that there exist index sets I ⊆ X with
Although we have assumed, in Definition 1, that s is uniformly distributed over F l , the following corollary immediately follows from [3, Lemma 2, Theorem 3].
Corollary 11. In Definition 1, assume that s ∈ F l is chosen according to an arbitrary distribution over F l and independently from c 2 . Even in this case, Theorem 9 still holds.
Note that the size of smallest index set I satisfying I(S;
≤ n always holds from Definition 5. Thus the secret vector s can always be reconstructed from some subsets of shares in the secret sharing scheme.
Comparison with Existing Results
Here we clarify that our bounds given in Theorem 9 are tighter than the ones of existing results.
First, consider the case of X = A , i.e., D 1 = C 1 and D 2 = C 2 , in the secret sharing scheme defined in Definition 1. Then, the scheme is equivalent to that of Duursma et al. [6] and the one referred to as a more fruitful approach in Although Chen et al. [4] mentioned that these bounds are not tight, they did not show any evidence.
Proposition 12.
Assume that X = A in the secret sharing scheme defined by Definition 1. Then, thresholds given by the right-hand side of Eq. (3) and Eq.(4) in Theorem 9 satisfy
Proof. From the definition of the RGHW (Definition 5), we always have
Recall that the first generalized Hamming weight [17] of C 1 is represented by M 1 (C 1 , { 0}) from Remark 7. Since the first generalized Hamming weight is the minimum Hamming weight [17] , we have d(
the threshold of I(S;C I ) = H(S), and
for that of I(S;C I ) = 0, respectively. 
Next, consider the following case of Definition 1. As- 
The following proposition proves that these bounds are not tight. 
Proposition 15. Assume that
N − n < d(D 1 ) and l = N − n = dim D 1 − dim D 2 inM 1 (C ⊥ 2 , C ⊥ 1 ) − 1 ≥ d(D ⊥ 1 ) − l − 1 and n − M 1 (C 1 , C 2 ) + 1 ≤ n + l − d(D 1 ) + 1, respectively. Proof. First, we prove M 1 (C ⊥ 2 , C ⊥ 1 ) − 1 ≥ d(D ⊥ 1 ) − l − 1. Let G ∈ F dim D 1 ×N be a generator matrix of D 1 . Then, the first l columns of G and arbitrary d(D ⊥ 1 ) − l − 1 columns chosen from the last n columns of G always span F d(D 1 )−1 .
This guarantees that I(S;C
Recall 
) − 1 since the threshold given by the right-hand side of Eq. (3) is always tight.
Next
is generated by puncturing the first l
Example 14 gives a case satisfying the inequality
, and the following example shows a case satisfying the inequality 
Strong Security of Secret Sharing Schemes
This section gives a refined definition of the strong security in secret sharing schemes. Further, we reveal that the scheme of Massey [11] and Chen et al. [4] can always achieve the strong security in the certain range of the number of shares, characterized by the RGHW.
Definition of the Strong Security
First, we introduce a special subset J of X called an anti-access set. This is the generalized definition of nonqualified sets in strongly-secure threshold ramp schemes, which is given by Yamamoto [18] . Let a secret vector be represented by s = [s 1 ,... ,s l ] , and S i (1 ≤ i ≤ l) be a random variable whose realization is s i . We denote by S I = (S i : i ∈ I ) a tuple of random variables for an index set I ⊆ {1,... ,l}. Assume that each share c i (i ∈ X ) is obtained from s as we presented in Sect. 2.1, and S 1 ,... ,S l are uniformly distributed over F and mutually independent. We then define an anti-access set as follows.
Definition 17 (Anti-access sets). Let J ⊆ X be an index set. For any subsets F ⊆ J and E ⊆ {1,... ,l} with |E | + |F | = |J | + 1, if we have
J is called an anti-access set.
Now we define the α-strong security of secret sharing schemes.
Definition 18 (α-strong security). A secret sharing scheme is called the one achieving α-strong security if all J ⊆ X with |J | = α are anti-access sets.
Consider the case where the thresholds given by the right-hand side of Eq. (3) and Eq.(4) in Theorem 9 satisfy
respectively. This can be attained when both C 1 and C 2 are maximum distance separable (MDS) codes [10] , e.g., Reed-Solomon codes. Then, from Theorem 9, the secret sharing scheme defined by Definition 1 is equivalent to a (dim C 1 , dim (C 2 /C 1 ), n)-threshold ramp scheme [1] , [18] . Moreover, if the scheme achieves the (dim C 1 − 1)-strong security, i.e., all nonqualified sets are anti-access sets, it is called a strongly-secure threshold ramp scheme [13] , [18] .
Characterization of the α-Strong Security
This subsection clarifies that the scheme proposed by Massey [11] and Chen et al. [4] can achieve the α-strong security where the value α is precisely characterized by the RGHW.
Consider the following case of Definition 1.
Then, this case is equivalent to the one proposed by Massey [11] and Chen et al. [4, Sect. 4.1] . We note that dim
, and that such ψ always exists.
Without any loss of generality, we suppose that D 1 is a systematic code. In other words, a generator matrix G 1 of D 1 is defined by the systematic form,
where I is an identity matrix. Also, a generator matrix G 2 of D 2 consists of last dim D 2 rows of G 1 . Under these suppositions, we have the following theorem. 
Proof. Since we supposed that a generator matrix G 1 of D 1 is systematic, the secret sharing scheme generates shares c l+1 ,... ,c l+n by
where r l+1 ,... ,r dim D 1 are chosen from F at random. This guarantees that, for each i ∈ {1,... ,l}, G 2,i is a subcode of 
Therefore, Theorem 9 yields that for any index sets R 1 ⊆ {1,... ,l}\{i} and R 2 ⊆ {l +1,... ,l +n} with
Next consider the mutual information between a subset of secret elements and a subset of shares. Let E = {k 1 ,... ,k |E | } ⊆ {1,... ,l} and F ⊆ {l + 1,... ,l + n} be arbitrary index sets. We then have
from the chain rule of conditional entropy [5] . Since the mutual information is nonnegative, we have I(S E ;C F ) = 0 if and
.. ,S k j−1 ) = 0 for only k j . Thus, for any index sets E and F satisfying
we always have I(S k j ;C F , S k 1 ,... ,S k j−1 ) = 0 for all k j simultaneously, and hence I(S E ;C F ) = 0 holds. Therefore, every subset of {l + 1,... ,l + n} with cardinality at most
is an anti-access set.
The value α in Theorem 19 for the α-strong security is as tight as the bounds in Theorem 9. This is because as follows. Let j ∈ {1,... ,l} be an element satisfy- The thresholds given by Theorem 9 are independent of the distribution of s as shown in Corollary 11. In contrast, s must be uniformly distributed over F l to establish Theorem 19. This is because elements of s need to be treated as random numbers that are mutually independent and uniformly distributed over F, as shown in the proof of Theorem 19.
It is proved in [8] This can be proved in a similar way to the proof of Proposition 15.
Hence the proof is omitted. We note that Example 16 also gives a case of min
Conclusion
This paper has given a precise characterization of secret sharing schemes based on arbitrary linear codes. We have characterized thresholds t 1 and t 2 by the relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW). One shows that any set of at most t 1 shares leaks no information about the secret, and the other shows that any set of at least t 2 shares uniquely determines the secret. Moreover, this paper has precisely characterized the strong security in secret sharing schemes by the RGHW, as a generalization of strongly-secure threshold ramp schemes. These characterizations enable to determine the property of secret sharing schemes from the parameters of linear codes, when we design systems using secret sharing schemes.
